Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that Augustine's discussion of divine foreknowledge in DcD 5.9 is distinguished by its anti-Ciceronian polemic, but no one has analyzed the philosophical structure of this polemic to determine if it is compelling. I argue that Augustine's presentation has significant philosophical merit for two reasons. First, Augustine's rigorous application of the principle, shared with Cicero, that "nothing occurs unless it is preceded by an efficient cause" is capable of answeringforcefully one of the chief difficulties that Cicero poses (...) against the possibility of divine omniscience of human choice-making. Second, Augustine's presentation contains the potential to answer persuasively the epistemological problem that Cicero states against divine foreknowledge in his De Jato and De divinatione but which Augustine ignores in DcD 5.9. (shrink)

An introduction to the philosophy of law, which offers a modern and critical appraisal of all the main issues and problems. This has become a very active area in the last ten years, and one on which philosophers, legal practitioners and theorists and social scientists have tended to converge. The more abstract questions about the nature of law and its relationship to social norms and moral standards are now seen to be directly relevant to more practical and indeed pressing questions (...) about the justification of punishment, civil disobedience, the enforcement of morality, and problems about justice, rights, welfare, and freedom. David Lyons is a shrewd, clear and systematic guide through this tangled area. The book presupposes no formal training in law or philosophy and is intended to serve as a textbook in a range of introductory courses. (shrink)

This innovative text is psychologically informed, both in its diagnosis of inferential errors, and in teaching students how to watch out for and work around their natural intellectual blind spots. It also incorporates insights from epistemology and philosophy of science that are indispensable for learning how to evaluate premises. The result is a hands-on primer for real world critical thinking. The authors bring a fresh approach to the traditional challenges of a critical thinking course: effectively explaining the nature of validity, (...) assessing deductive arguments, reconstructing, identifying and diagramming arguments, and causal and probabilistic inference. Additionally, they discuss in detail, important, frequently neglected topics, including testimony, including the evaluation of news and other information sources, the nature and credibility of science, rhetoric, and dialectical argumentation. The treatment of probability uses frequency trees and a frequency approach more generally, and argument reconstruction is taught using argument maps; these methods have been shown to improve students’ reasoning and argument evaluation. (shrink)

Canada has recently published a new Clinical Practice Guideline on the diagnosis and management of brain death. It states that consent is not necessary to carry out the interventions required to make the diagnosis. A supporting article not only sets out the arguments for this but also contends that ‘UK laws similarly carve out an exception, excusing clinicians from a prima facie duty to get consent’. This is supplemented by the claim that recent court decisions in the UK similarly confirm (...) that consent is not required, referencing two judgements in _Battersbee_. We disagree with the authors’ interpretation of the law on consent in the UK and argue that there is nothing in _Battersbee_ to support the conclusion that consent to testing is not necessary. Where there is a disagreement about testing for brain death in the UK, court authorisation is required. (shrink)

The Snowden revelations about National Security Agency surveillance, starting in 2013, along with the ambiguous complicity of internet companies and the international controversies that followed provide a perfect segue into contemporary conundrums of surveillance and Big Data. Attention has shifted from late C20th information technologies and networks to a C21st focus on data, currently crystallized in “Big Data.” Big Data intensifies certain surveillance trends associated with information technology and networks, and is thus implicated in fresh but fluid configurations. This is (...) considered in three main ways: One, the capacities of Big Data intensify surveillance by expanding interconnected datasets and analytical tools. Existing dynamics of influence, risk-management, and control increase their speed and scope through new techniques, especially predictive analytics. Two, while Big Data appears to be about size, qualitative change in surveillance practices is also perceptible, accenting consequences. Important trends persist – the control motif, faith in technology, public-private synergies, and user-involvement – but the future-orientation increasingly severs surveillance from history and memory and the quest for pattern-discovery is used to justify unprecedented access to data. Three, the ethical turn becomes more urgent as a mode of critique. Modernity's predilection for certain definitions of privacy betrays the subjects of surveillance who, so far from conforming to the abstract, disembodied image of both computing and legal practices, are engaged and embodied users-in-relation whose activities both fuel and foreclose surveillance. (shrink)

This paper is particularly concerned with shame, sometimes considered the ‘master emotion’, and its possible role in affecting the consent process, specifically where that shame relates to the issue of diminished health literacy. We suggest that the absence of exploration of affective issues in general during the consent process is problematic, as emotions commonly impact upon our decision-making process. Experiencing shame in the healthcare environment can have a significant influence on choices related to health and healthcare, and may lead to (...) discussions of possibilities and alternatives being closed off. In the case of impaired health literacy we suggest that it obstructs the narrowing of the epistemic gap between clinician and patient normally achieved through communication and information provision. Health literacy shame prevents acknowledgement of this barrier. The consequence is that it may render consent less effective than it otherwise might have been in protecting the person's autonomy. We propose that the absence of consideration of health literacy shame during the consent process diminishes the possibility of the patient exerting full control over their choices, and thus bodily integrity. (shrink)

While research on children is supported by many professional guidelines, international declarations and domestic legislation, when it is undertaken on children with no possibility of direct benefit it rests on shaky moral foundations. A number of authors have suggested that research enrolment is in the child's best interests, or that they have a moral duty or societal obligation to participate. However, these arguments are unpersuasive. Rather, I will propose in this paper that research participation by children seems most reasonable when (...) considered as an act of solidarity; a form of identification with, and provision of practical assistance to, those who are less well off. This is an articulation of the view that many children, and their parents, seem to take seriously the suffering of others, and wish to assist in advancing other children's wellbeing. Perhaps, by fostering an environment in which children are encouraged to take solidarity seriously, participation in research which holds out substantial hope of benefit to those less well off would come to be perceived as a behavioural norm rather than an exceptional practice. (shrink)

The decision of the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority carved out a safe space for competent minors to confidentially access sexual and reproductive health care and advice in the UK. Ireland is one of the few common law jurisdictions that has not endorsed Gillick or a similar mature minor doctrine, nor has it securely legislated for the right to consent of those aged 16 and 17 years. The legal lacuna created by this deficiency has (...) left young persons in Ireland seeking sexual and reproductive healthcare, and the clinicians who provide this, in a challenging place. While this void has been partially filled with policy statements by bodies such as the Irish College of General Practitioners and the Health Service Executive, nonetheless the legal shortcomings leave both a sense of insecurity, and real world difficulties for adolescents seeking to access to sexual and reproductive healthcare. (shrink)

UTILITARIAN GENERALIZATION Sometimes an act is criticized just because the results of everyone's acting similarly would be bad. The generalization test ...

In the context of critically ill children, Baines contended that the best interests test was neither objective nor coherent, and thus of little applicability in making end-of-life decisions. In reply, Bridgeman attempted to refute these claims through legal analysis and contended that the doctrine allowed for responsive, fact-specific, context-sensitive and prudential reasoning. This paper is a response to Bridgeman, and argues that an examination of case law reveals the subjective and value-laden nature of the test. Courts must make decisions in (...) contested cases, but there is no reason to hold that a judge can divine the best interests of a critically ill child better than either parents or medical staff. This paper analyses a number of cases where judicial decisions appear at odds with the child's best interests, and argues that as the outcome depends upon the value system of the decision-maker the test is unhelpful in contested end-of-life cases. (shrink)

This essay investigates the influences that led J.B. Watson to change from being a student in an introspectionist laboratory at Chicago to being the founder of systematic (or radical) behaviourism. Our focus is the crucial period, 1913-1914, when Watson struggled to give a convincing behaviourist account of mental imaging, which he considered to be the greatest obstacle to his behaviourist programme. We discuss in detail the evidence for and against the view that, at least eventually, Watson rejected outright the very (...) existence of mental images. We also discuss in detail whether or not Knight Dunlap was the crucial influence on his eventual rejection of mental images. Finally we consider whether Watson's rejection of mental images was bolstered by some personal incapacity as regards imaging or whether his rejection was more like a form of 'ideological blindness'. (shrink)

David Lyons; VII*—The Internal Morality of Law, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 105–120, https://doi.org/10.1093.

David Lyons; VII*—The Internal Morality of Law, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 105–120, https://doi.org/10.1093.

The reality of current clinical practice in the UK is that where a patient’s family refuses to agree to testing for brain stem death (BD), such cases will ultimately end up in court. This situation is true of both adults and children and reinforced by recent legal cases. While recourse to the courts might be regrettable in such tragic cases, if public trust in the medical diagnosis of BD is to be maintained all aspects of the process must be conducted (...) in a way that is transparent and open to scrutiny. This is not an ‘ineffective expenditure’ of resources, but an essential element of a human rights-compliant legal system. (shrink)

David Lyons is one of the pre-eminent philosophers of law active in the United States. This volume comprises essays written over a period of twenty years in which Professor Lyons outlines his fundamental views about the nature of law and its relation to morality and justice. The underlying theme of the book is that a system of law has only a tenuous connection with morality and justice. Contrary to those legal theorists who maintain that no matter how (...) bad the law of a community might be, strict conformity to existing law automatically dispenses 'formal' justice, Professor Lyons contends that the law must earn the respect that it demands. Moreover, we cannot, as some would suggest, interpret law in a value-neutral manner. Rather courts should interpret statutes, judicial precedents, and constitutional provisions in terms of values that would justify those laws. In this way officials can promote the justifiability of what they do to people in the name of law, and can help the law live up to its moral pretensions. (shrink)

David Lyons challenges us to confront grave injustices committed in the United States, from the colonists' encroachments on Indian lands to slavery and the legacy of racism. He calls upon legal and political theorists to take these social wrongs seriously in their approaches to moral obligation under law and the justification of civil disobedience.

This volume collects David Lyons' well-known essays on Mill's moral theory and includes an introduction which relates the essays to prior and subsequent philosophical developments. Like the author's Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, 1965), the essays apply analytical methods to issues in normative ethics. The first essay defends a refined version of the beneficiary theory of rights against H.L.A. Hart's important criticisms. The central set of essays develops new interpretations of Mill's moral theory with the aim of (...) determining how far rights can be incorporated in a utilitarian framework. They Mill's analysis of moral concepts promises to accommodate the argumentative force of rights, and also provide a significant new reading of Mill's theory of liberty. The last essay argues that the promise of Mill's theory of justice cannot be fulfilled. Utilitarianism is unable to account for crucial features of moral rights, or even for the moral force of legal rights whose existence might be justified on utilitarian grounds. (shrink)

In 2010, President Obama instructed the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues to enquire into research carried out by the US Public Health Service in Guatemala between 1946 and 1948. These studies entailed the deliberate inoculation of unconsenting prisoners, mental asylum patients and soldiers, with venereal disease. There was also evidence of deception and secrecy. The Commission’s report describes the research as heinous, egregious, unconscionable and unjustifiable, and identified those responsible as morally blameworthy. However, this article argues that (...) the Commission was deficient in its historical analysis, and failed to appreciate particular disease and temporal factors that might cast the research in a slightly different light. This is not to exculpate the researchers, but rather to critique the Commission’s analysis. The straightforward narrative woven by the Commission does not accurately reflect the muddy ethical waters of the time, nor the utilitarian ethos that pervaded particular research agendas. The creation of a facile story denies to us a proper understanding of why events unfolded as they did, and as a consequence a potential lack of comprehension of those elements that might prevent unethical and harmful research practices from being conducted in the future. (shrink)